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Abstract—In this paper we develop network protection strate-
gies against a single link failure in optical networks. The
motivation behind this work is the fact that %70 of all available
links in an optical network suffers from a single link failure. In
the proposed protection strategies, denoted NPS-I and NPS-II,
we deploy network coding and reduced capacity on the working
paths to provide a backup protection path that will carry encoded
data from all sources. In addition, we provide implementation
aspects and how to deploy the proposed strategies in case of an
optical network with n disjoint working paths.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main services of operation networks that must
be deployed efficiently is reliability. In order to deploy a
reliable networking strategy, the transmitted signals must be
protected over unreliable links. Link failures are common
problems that might occur frequently in single and multiple
operating communication circuits. In network survivability and
network resilience, one needs to design efficient strategies to
overcome this dilemma. Optical network survivability tech-
niques are classified as pre-designed protection and dynamic
restoration [13], [19], [22], [24]. The approach of using pre-
designed protections aims to reserve enough bandwidth such
that when a failure occurs, backup paths are used to reroute
the transmission and to recover the data. Examples of this
approach are 1-1 and 1-N protections [11], [14]. In dynamic
restoration reactive strategies, capacity is not reserved. How-
ever, when the failure occurs, dynamic recovery is used to
recover the data transmitted in the links that are suffered from
failures. This technique does not require preserved resources
or provisioning extra paths that work in case of failure. In this
work we will provide several strategies of dynamic restoration
based on network coding and reduced distributed fairness
capacities.
Network coding is a powerful tool that has been recently
used to increase the throughput, capacity, security, and per-
formance of communication networks. Information theoretic
aspects of network coding have been investigated in [21], [23],
[1]. Network coding allows the intermediate nodes not only
to forward packets using network scheduling algorithms, but
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also encode/decode them using algebraic primitive operations,
see [1], [6], [21], [23], and references therein. Network coding
is used to maximize the throughput [1], [9], [15], network
capacity [20], [5], [16]. Also, it is robust against packet losses
and network failures [7], [18], and enhances network security
and protection [8], [17]. It is believed that network coding will
be deployed in all relay nodes and network operations.
Network protection against a single link failure (SLF) by
adding one extra path has been introduced in [10], [11],
[12]. The source nodes are able to combine their data into
a single extra path (backup protection path) that is used to
protect all signals on the working paths carrying data from
all sources. Also, protection against multiple link failures has
been presented in [13], [14], [8], where m extra paths are
used. In both cases, p-cycles have been used for protection
against single and multiple link failures. In this model the
source nodes are assumed to send their data with a full capacity
relaying on the extra paths to protect their data. However,
there are situations where the extra paths approach might not
be applicable, and one needs to design a protection strategy
depending solely on the available resources [2], [13], [3], [4].
In this work we will assume that all paths are working and
adding extra paths to the available ones is a difficult task. We
apply two network protection strategies called NPS-I and NPS-
II, each of which has (n− 1)/n normalized network capacity.
In these two strategies, we show how the sources achieve
the encoding operation and distribute their link’s capacities
among them for fairness. We assume that one of the working
paths will overlap to carry encoded data, therefore, acting as
a protection path.
In this paper we introduce a model for network protection
against a single link failure in optical networks. In this model,
the network capacity will be reduced by partial factor in order
to achieve the required protection. Several advantages of NPS-
I and NPS-II strategies can be stated as follows.
• The data originated from the sources is protected without
adding extra secondary paths. We assume that one of
the working paths will act as a protection path carrying
encoded data.
• The encoding and decoding operations are achieved on-
line with less computational cost at both the sources and
receivers.
2• The normalized network capacity is (n − 1)/n, which
is near-optimal in the case of using large number of n
connection paths.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tions II and III we present the network model and problem
setup, respectively. The definitions of the normalized capacity,
working and protection paths are given. In Section IV we
present a network protection strategy NPS-I against a single
link/path failure using an extra dedicated path. In addition in
Section V we provide the network protection strategy NPS-
II which deployed network coding and reduced capacity. The
implementation aspects of NPS-I and NPS-II are discussed in
Section VI, and finally the paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. NETWORK MODEL
The network model can be describe as follows.
i) Let N be a network represented by an abstract graph
G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E be set of
undirected edges. Let S and R is a sets of independent
sources and destinations, respectively. The set V = V ∪
S∪R contains the relay nodes, sources, and destinations.
Assume for simplicity that |S| = |R| = n, hence the set
of sources is equal to the set of receivers.
ii) A path (connection) is a set of edges connected together
with a starting node (sender) and an ending node (re-
ceiver).
Li = {(si, e1i), (e1i, e2i), . . . , (e(m)i, ri)},
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and (e(j−1)i, eji) ∈ E for some integer
m.
iii) The node can be a router, switch, or an end terminal
depending on the network model N and the transmission
layer.
iv) L is a set of links L = {L1, L2, . . . , Ln} carrying the
data from the sources to the receivers as shown in Fig. 1.
All connections have the same bandwidth, otherwise a
connection with high bandwidth can be divided into
multiple connections, each of which has a unit capacity.
There are exactly n connections.
v) Each sender si ∈ S will transmit its own data xi to a
receiver ri through a connection Li. Also, si will transmit
encoded data
∑n
i xi to ri at different time slot if it is
assigned to send the encoded data.
vi) The data from all sources are sent in sessions. Each
session has a number of time slots n. Hence tℓδ is a value
at round time slot ℓ in session δ.
vii) In this model N , we consider only a single link failure,
it is sufficient to apply the encoding and decoding oper-
ations over a finite field with two elements, we denote it
F2 = {0, 1}.
viii) There are at least two receivers and two senders with at
least two disjoint paths, otherwise the protection model
can not be deployed for a single path, in which it can not
protect itself.
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Fig. 1. Network protection against a single link failure using reduced capacity
and network coding. One link out of n primary links carries encoded data.
We will define the working and protection paths between
two network nodes (switches and routers) in optical networks
as shown in Fig. 2.
Definition 1: The working paths on a network with n
connection paths carry traffic under normal operations. The
Protection paths provide an alternate backup path to carry the
traffic in case of failures. A protection scheme ensures that
data sent from the sources will reach the receivers in case of
failure incidences on the working paths.
III. PROBLEM SETUP AND TERMINOLOGY
We assume that there is a set of n disjoint connections that
requires protections with %100 guaranteed against a single
link failure (SLF). All connections have the same bandwidth,
and each link (one hop) with a bandwidth can be a circuit.
Every sender si prepares a packet packetsi→ri to send to
the receiver ri. The packet contains the sender’s ID, data xℓi ,
and a round time for every session tℓδ for some integers δ and
ℓ. We have two types of packets:
i) Packets sent without coding, in which the sender does not
need to perform any coding operations. For example, in
case of packets sent without coding, the sender si sends
the following packet to the receiver ri:
packetsi→ri := (IDsi , x
ℓ
i , t
ℓ
δ) (1)
ii) Packets sent with encoded data, in which the sender needs
to send other senders’ data. In this case, the sender si
sends the following packet to the receiver ri:
packetsi→ri := (IDsi ,
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
xℓj , t
ℓ
δ). (2)
The value yℓi =
∑n
j=1,j 6=i x
ℓ
j is computed by every sender
si, in which it is able to collect the data from all other
senders and encode them using the bit-wise operation.
In either case the sender has a full capacity in the connection
link Li. We will provide more elaboration in this scenario in
Section VI, where implementation aspects will be discussed.
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Fig. 2. Network protection against a single path failure using reduced
capacity and network coding. One path out of n primary paths carries encoded
data. The black points represent various other relay nodes
We can define the network capacity from min-cut max-flow
information theoretic view [1]. It can be described as follows.
Definition 2: The unit capacity of a connecting path Li
between si and ri is defined as:
ci =
{
1, Li is active;
0, otherwise. (3)
The total capacity of N is given by the summation of all path
capacities. What we mean by an active path is that the receiver
is able to receive and process signals/messages throughout this
path.
Clearly, if all paths are active then the total capacity is n
and normalized capacity is 1. If we assume there are n disjoint
paths, then, in general, the capacity of the network for the
active and failed paths is computed by:
CN =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ci. (4)
There have been several techniques developed to provide
network survivability. Such techniques will add additional
resources for the sake of recovery from failures. They will
also depend on the time it takes to recover from failures,
and how much delay the receiver can tolerate. Hence, network
survivability is a multi-objective problem in terms of resource
efficiency, operation cost, and agility. Optimizing these objec-
tives has taken much attention recently, and has led to the
design of more efficient reliable networks.
IV. NETWORK PROTECTIONS AGAINST A SLF USING
EXTRA AND DEDICATED PATHS
Assume we have n connections carrying data from a set of
n sources to a set of n receivers. All connections represent
disjoint paths, and the sources are independent of each other.
The author in [10], [11] introduced a model for protecting an
optical network against a single link failure using an extra path
provision. The idea is to establish a new connection from the
sources to the receivers using virtual (secondary) source and
virtual (secondary) receiver. The goal of the secondary source
is to collect data from all other sources and encode it using
the Xored operation.
The extra path that carries the encoded data from all sources
is one cycle. In the encoding operations every source si adds
its value, and the cycle starts at source s1 and ends at source
sn. Hence, the encoded data after performing the cycle or
extra path is X =
∑n
i=1 xi. The decoding operations are done
at every receiver ri by adding the data si received over the
link Li. The node rj with failed connection Lj will be able
to recover the data xj . Assuming all operations are achieved
over the binary finite field F2. Hence we have:
xj = X −
n∑
i=1,i6=j
xℓi . (5)
Protecting With Extra Paths (NPS-I): We will describe the
network protection strategy NPS-I against a single link failure
in optical networks. Assume a source si generates a message
xℓi at round time tℓδ. Put differently:
packetsi = (IDsi , x
ℓ
i , t
ℓ
δ). (6)
The packetsi is transmitted from the source si to a destination
ri for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It is sent in the primary working path
Li, i.e. a path that conveys an unencoded data. The secondary
protection path provisioned from a source s to destination r
can convey the message:
packets = (IDs,
n∑
i=1
xℓi , t
ℓ
δ). (7)
This process is explained in Scheme (8).
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All yj’s are defined over F2 as:
yj =
n∑
i=1
xji . (9)
We notice that the encoded data yj is fixed per one session
transmission and it is fixed for other sessions. This means
that the path Lj is dedicated to sending all encoded data
y1, y2, . . . , yn.
4Lemma 3: The normalized capacity of NPS-I of the net-
work model N described in Scheme (8) is given by
C = (n)/(n+ 1) (10)
Proof: In every session, we have n rounds. Furthermore,
in every round there are (n + 1) senders with n + 1 disjoint
paths, and only one sender sends encoded data. Therefore C =
n2/(n+ 1)n, which gives the result.
Protecting Without Extra Paths: If we do not allow an extra
path, then one of the available working paths can be used to
carry the encoded data as shown in Scheme (11). It shows that
a path Lj exists which carries the encoded data sent from the
source sj to the receiver rj .
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All yℓj’s are defined over F2 as
yℓj =
n∑
i=1,i6=j
xℓi . (12)
We notice that the encoded data yj is fixed per one
session transmission but it is varied for other sessions. This
means that the path Lj is dedicated to send all encoded data
y1, y2, . . . , yn.
Lemma 4: The normalized capacity of the network model
N described in Scheme (11) is given as:
C = (n− 1)/n (13)
The implementation aspects of this strategy is discussed in
Section VI.
V. NETWORK PROTECTION AGAINST A SLF USING
DISTRIBUTED CAPACITY AND CODING
In this section we will provide a network protection strategy
against a single link failure using distributed fairness capacity
and coding. This strategy is called NPS-II. We will compute
the network capacity in each approach and how the optimal
capacity can be written with partial delay at rounds of a given
session for a sender si. In [3] we will also illustrate the tradeoff
between the two approaches, where there is enough space for
details.
NPS-II Protecting a SLF: We will describe the NPS-II
which protects a single link failure using network coding
and reduced capacity. Assume there is a path Lj that will
carry the encoded data from the source sj to the receiver rj .
Consider a failed link (u, v) ∈ E, which the path Li goes
through. We would like to design an encoding scheme such
that a backup copy of data on Li can also be sent over a
different path Lj . This process is explained in Scheme (15),
and is call it Network Protection Strategy (NPS-II) against a
single Link/path failure (SLF). The data is sent in rounds for
every session. Also, we assume the failure happens only in
one path throughout a session, but different paths might suffer
from failures throughout different sessions. Indeed most of
the current optical networks suffer experience a single link
failure [24], [22].
The objective of the proposed network protection strategy
is to withhold rerouting the signals or the transmitted packets
due to link failures. However, we provide strategies that utilize
network coding and reduced capacity at the source nodes. We
assume that the source nodes are able to perform encoding
operations and the receiver nodes are able to perform decoding
operations. We will allow the sources to provide backup copies
that will be sent through the available paths simultaneously
and in the same existing connections.
Let xji be the data sent from the source si at round time j
in a session δ. Also, assume yj =
∑n
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=i x
j
ℓ . Put differently
yj = x
j
1 ⊕ x
j
2 ⊕ . . .⊕ x
j
n. (14)
The protection scheme runs in sessions as explained below. For
the (n − 1)/n strategy presented in Scheme (15), the design
issues are described as follows.
i) A total of (n − 1) link disjoint paths between (n − 1)
senders S and receivers R are provisioned to carry the
signals from S to R. Each path has the unit capacity and
data unit from si in S to ri in R are sent in rounds. Data
unit xni is sent from source si at round (n) in a specific
session.
ii) A server S is able to collect the signals from all n sources
and is able to provision yj =
∑n
i=1,i6=k x
j
i at round time
j. A single source sk is used to deliver yj to the receiver
rk. This process is achieved at one particular session.
The encoded data yj is distributed equally among all n
sources.
iii) In the first round time at a particular session, the data x1i
is sent from si to ri in all paths for i = {1, . . . , n} and
i 6= j. Only the source sj will send yj to the receiver rj
over the path Lj at round tℓδ.
yj =
n∑
i=1,j 6=j
xℓi .
iv) We always neglect the communication and computational
cost between the senders and data collector S, as well as
the receivers and data collector R.
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In this case y1 =
∑n−1
i=1 x
1
i and in general yj’s are defined
over F2 as
yj =
n−j∑
i=1
xji +
n∑
i=n−j+2
xj−1i . (16)
The senders send packets to the set of receivers in rounds.
Every packet initiated from the sender si contains ID, data
xsi , and a round tℓδ . For example, the sender si will send the
packetsi as follows.
packetsi = (IDsi , xsi , t
ℓ
δ). (17)
Also, the sender sj will send the encoded data ysj as
packetsi = (IDsj , ysj , t
ℓ
δ). (18)
We ensure that the encoded data ysj is varied per one round
transmission for every session. This means that the path Lj
is dedicated to send only one encoded data yj and all data
x1j , x
2
j , . . . , x
n−1
j .
Remark 5: In NPS-I, the data transmitted from the sources
does not experience any round time delay. This means that the
receivers will be able to decode the received packets online
and immediately recover the failed data.
Lemma 6: The normalized capacity NPS-I of the network
model N described in Scheme (15) is given by
C = (n− 1)/(n) (19)
Proof: We have n rounds and the total number of trans-
mitted packets in every round is n. Also, in every round there
are (n-1) un-encoded data x1, x2, . . . xi6=j , . . . , xn and only
one encoded data yj , for all i = 1, . . . , n. Hence, the capacity
cℓ in every round is n− 1. Therefor, the normalized capacity
is given by
C =
∑n
ℓ=1 cℓ
n ∗ n
=
(n− 1) ∗ n
n2
. (20)
The following lemma shows that the network protection
strategy NPS-II is in fact optimal if we consider F2. In
other words, there exist no other strategies that give better
normalized capacity than NPS-II.
Lemma 7: The network protection scheme NPS-II against
a single link failure is optimal.
The transmission is done in rounds, hence linear combina-
tions of data have to be from the same round time. This can be
achieved using the round time that is included in each packet
sent by a sender.
Encoding Process: There are several scenarios where the en-
coding operations can be achieved. The encoding and decoding
operations will depend mainly on the network topology; how
the senders and receivers are distributed in the network.
• The encoding operation is done at only one source si.
In this case all other sources must send their data to si,
which will send encoded data over Li. We assume that
all sources have shared paths with each other.
• If we assume there is a data distributor S, then the source
nodes send a copy of their data to the data distributor S, in
which it will decide which source will send the encoding
data and all other sources will send their own data. This
process will happen in every round during transmission
time.
• The encoding is done by the bit-wise operation which
is the fastest arithmetic operation that can be performed
among all source’s data.
• The distributor S will change the sender that should send
the encoded data in every round of a given session.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION ASPECTS
In this section we shall provide implementation aspects
of the proposed protection strategy in case of a single link
failure. The network protection strategy against a link failure is
deployed in two processes: Encoding and decoding operations.
The encoding operations are performed at the set of sources,
in which one or two sources will send the encoded data
depending on the strategy used . The decoding operations are
performed at the receivers’ side, in which a receiver with
a failed link had to Xor all other receivers’ data in order
to recover its own data. Depending on NPS-I or NPS-II the
receivers will experience some delay before they can actually
decode the packets. If the failure happen in the protection path
of NPS-I, then the receivers do not perform any decoding
operations because all working paths will convey data from
the senders to receivers. However, if the failure happens in the
working path, the receivers must perform decoding operations
to recovery the failure using the protection path. We also note
that the delay will happen only when the failure occurs in the
protection paths.
The synchronization between senders and receivers are done
using the time rounds, hence linear combinations of data have
to be from the same round time. Each packet sent by a sender
has its own time and ID. In this part we will assume that there
is a data distributor S at the sources side and data distributor
R at the receivers side.
Encoding Process: The encoded process of the proposed
protection strategies can be done as follows.
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Fig. 3. An example that shows network protection against single failure
using reduced capacity.
• The source nodes send a copy of their data to the data
distributor S, then S will decide which source will send
the encoding data and all other sources will send their
own data. This process will happen in every round during
transmission time.
• The encoding is done by the bit-wise operation which
is the fastest arithmetic operation that can be performed
among all source’s data.
• The server S will change the sender that should send the
encoded data in every round of a given session.
• This process will be repeated in every session during
transmission till all sources send their data.
Decoding Process: The decoding process is done in a similar
way as the encoding process. We assume there is a data
distributor server S that assigns the senders that will send only
their own data as shown in Fig. 3. In addition S will encode
the data from all senders and distribute it only to the sender
that will transmit the encoded data over its path. The objective
is to withhold rerouting the signals or the transmitted packets
due to link failures. However, we provide strategies that utilize
network coding and reduced capacity at the source nodes.
We assume there is a data distributor R that will collect
data from all working and protection paths and is able to
perform the decoding operations. In this case we assume that
all receivers R have available shared paths with the data
collector R. At the receivers side, if there is one single failure
in a path Lk, then there are several situations.
• If the path Lk carries data without encoding (it is a
working path), then the data distributor R must query
all other nodes in order to recover the failed data. In this
case rk must query R to retrieve its data.
• If the path Lk carries encoded data yk, then it does not
need to perform any action, since yk is used for protection
and does not have any valued data.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a strategy for network protection
against a single link failure in optical networks. We showed
that protecting a single link failure in optical networks can
be achieved using network coding and reduced capacity. In
addition, we provided implementation aspects of the proposed
network protection strategies.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Ahlswede, N. Cai, S.-Y. R. Li, and R. W. Yeung. Network information
flow. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 46:1204–1216, 2000.
[2] S. A. Aly and A. E. Kamal. Network protection codes against link
failures using network coding. In Proc. IEEE GlobelComm ’08, New
Orleans, LA, December 2008.
[3] S. A. Aly and A. E. Kamal. Reduced capacity coding-based network
protection strategies. IEEE Transaction on Networking, under submis-
sion, 2008.
[4] S. A. Aly and A. E. Kamal. Network protection strategies against single
and multiple link failures using reduced capacity and network coding.
submited US Patent, filed on May 04, 2008.
[5] S. A. Aly, V. Kapoor, J. Meng, and A. Klappenecker. Bounds on
the network coding capacity for wireless random networks. In Third
Workshop on Network Coding, Theory, and Applications, NetCod’07,
January 2007.
[6] C. Fragouli, J. Le Boudec, and J. Widmer. Network coding: An instant
primer. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 36(1):63–
68, 2006.
[7] T. Ho, R. Koetter, M. Medard, D. Karger, and M. Effros. The benefits
of coding over routing in a randomized setting. In Proc. of the IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT03), page 442,
Yokohama, Japan, June 2003.
[8] S. Jaggi, M. Langberg, S. Katti, T. Ho, D. Katabi, and M. Medard.
Resilient network coding in the presence of byzantine adversaries. In
Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2007.
[9] S. Jaggi, P. Sanders, A. Chou, M. Errfos, S. Egner, K. Jain, and
L. Tolhuizen. Polynomial time algorithms for multicast network code
construction. In IEEE Tran. Inform. Theory, 2003.
[10] A. E. Kamal. 1+N protection in optical mesh networks using network
coding on p-cycles. In Proc. of the IEEE Globecom, 2006.
[11] A. E. Kamal. 1+N protection against multiple faults in mesh networks. In
Proc. of the IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC),
2007.
[12] A. E. Kamal. Gmpls-based hybrid 1+N link protection over p-cycles:
Design and performance. In Proc. of IEEE Globecom, 2007.
[13] A. E. Kamal. 1+N network protection for mesh networks: network
coding-based protection using p-cycles. submitted to IEEE Journal of
Communication, 2008.
[14] A. E. Kamal. A generalized strategy for 1+N protection. In Proc. of
the IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2008.
[15] R. Koetter and M. Medard. An algebraic approach to network coding.
IEEE/ACM transactions on networking, 2003.
[16] Z. Kong, S.A. Aly, E. Soljanin, E. Yan, and A. Klappenecker. Net-
work coding capacity of random wireless networks under a signal-
to-interference-and-noise model. Proceedings of the 45th Allerton
Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Urbana, IL,
September 2007. arXiv:cs-IT/0708.3070v.
[17] L. Lima, M. Medard, and J. Barrows. Random linear network coding:
A free cipher. In ISIT 06, 2006.
[18] D. S. Lun, N. Ranakar, R. Koetter, M. Medard, E. Ahmed, and H. Lee.
Achieving minimum-cost multicast: A decentralized approach based on
network coding. In In Proc. the 24th IEEE INFOCOM, volume 3, pages
1607– 1617, March 2005.
[19] A. Markopoulou, S. Iannaccone, G. Bhattacharyya, C. N. Chuah, and
C. Diot. Characterization of failures in an ip backbone network. In
Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM ’04, March 2004.
[20] A. Ramamoorthy, J. Shi, and R. D. Wesel. On the capacity of network
coding for random networks. IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, 51(8):2878–
2885, Aug. 2005.
[21] E. Soljanin and C. Fragouli. Network codinginformation flow perspec-
tive. 2007.
[22] A. K. Somani. Survivability and traffic grooming in Optical Networks.
Cambridge Press, 2006.
[23] R. W. Yeung, S.-Y. R. Li, N. Cai, and Z. Zhang. Network Coding Theory.
Now Publishers Inc., 2006.
[24] D. Zhou and S. Subramaniam. Survivability in optical networks. IEEE
network, 14:16–23, Nov./Dec. 2000.
